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Canary · Last attested 2026-05-28

Warrant canary.

Published monthly. As long as this page updates on time, we have not been compelled by a gag-bound legal process to act against any customer. If it stops updating, that absence is the message.

Read the statement 서비스 약관
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As of May 2026, NoKycVPS has received zero National Security Letters, gag-bound court orders, and zero secret subpoenas under any jurisdiction in which we operate. No customer data has been disclosed to any third party except where mandated by a public, judicial order naming the specific service — and in those cases the affected customer was notified before any action was taken.

01

What we attest, this month

  • We have not received any National Security Letter or equivalent gag-bound process from any government, in any of our operating jurisdictions (France, Iceland, Switzerland, Romania), between the previous canary date and today.
  • We have not received any secret subpoena, secret search warrant, or any other secret court order requesting customer data or compelling silence about its existence.
  • We have not been required to install or modify any equipment to facilitate surveillance, monitoring, or backdoor access to customer systems.
  • We have not been asked to hand over master encryption keys, signing keys, or service-wide credentials.
  • No third party — government, intelligence service, contractor, or otherwise — has been given direct or indirect access to our infrastructure beyond what is necessary for routine network operation.
02

How to read this page

The canary is renewed on the first business day of every month. Renewal means re-publishing a signed statement that the items above are still true. The signature is OpenPGP, made with the key fingerprint shown below.

  • Last attested: 2026-05-28
  • Next expected update: June 1, 2026
  • If the next-expected date passes by more than 7 days without an update, assume something has changed. Stop relying on the unstated guarantees of our terms, withdraw what matters, and contact us out-of-band through PGP-encrypted email.
03

Signature & verification

Each monthly canary is published in plain text alongside an OpenPGP signature made with the operator key. To verify a signed canary, fetch the signed text file and the public key, then verify:

curl -s https://nokycvps.com/canary.asc -o canary.asc
curl -s https://nokycvps.com/canary-key.asc | gpg --import
gpg --verify canary.asc

The signed plain-text file matches the statement above byte-for-byte. If the signature does not verify, or if the fingerprint of the signing key has changed without prior notice, the canary is invalid.

Note: the published signature is regenerated only by the operator on a key held offline. We do not store the private key on any server that processes customer requests.

04

Why this matters

A warrant canary cannot be compelled into existence — and that is the whole point. A gag order can prevent us from telling you that something has happened. It cannot force us to lie. So we say nothing has happened, every month, until one day we stop saying it.

If you operate infrastructure or publishing on top of us where compelled disclosure would meaningfully damage you, monitor this page. The friction of checking it monthly is a feature, not a bug.